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THE DUE-ON-SALE CLAUSE: CURRENT LEGISLATIVE
ACTIONS AND PROBABLE TRENDS
RICHARD W. THORNBURG
I. INTRODUCTION
The desire to own one's own home is deeply imbedded in the
fabric of American life. The problems created by the inflation of
housing prices, coupled with an even greater inflation in the price
of mortgage funds, are cutting sharply into the ability to realize
this goal. The higher interest rates for long-term mortgage money
have raised monthly payments beyond the reach of all but the few
who are able to advance a large down payment to reduce the
amount financed.
Facing this problem, many home purchasers have looked to in-
novative financing techniques built around the assumption of an
existing low interest rate mortgage. Second mortgages, wrap-
around mortgages, and land contracts' are all based on transferring
equitable title to property, but retaining the old loan with its lower
payments.
Lenders, however, are caught in a bind between long-term assets
and short-term liabilities, and are anxious to free themselves from
these long-term, low-interest loans.2 The device with which they
seek to speed this conversion is the "due-on" clause. This comment
will examine the due-on clause in terms of its history and current
usage. It will then look at the issue of preemption of state law by
federal regulations in those states which limit the use of due-on
clauses. This comment will examine the nature and history of the
due-on-sale clause, as well as some indications of congressional in-
tent. It will examine the trend of events, attempt to predict future
trends, and suggest some courses of action.
1. Land contracts, as used here, are contracts by which the seller takes a down-payment
substantially equal to his equity, but continues to hold legal title to the property and make
the mortgage payments from funds received from the buyer. Possession (equitable title)
passes to the buyer immediately, but legal title passes only when the entire balance is paid.
A wrap-around mortgage is a variation of this, where the seller takes a down-payment for
substantially less that his equity, "wraps" a second mortgage "around"-his current indebt-
edness, then pays both himself and the mortgage from the substantially higher payments
made by the new owner.
1 2. Lenders in the "thrift industry", which finances most housing purchses, have portfo-
lios made up of long term mortgages as assets, and short term deposits and certificates as
liabilities. In periods of inflation they need to adjust this portfolio toward higher yield as-
sets, as will be seen infra.
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II. THE DUE-ON CLAUSE
A. Types of Due-on Clauses
"Due-on" clauses are contract provisions in financing documents
which accelerate the balance due and call for the remaining princi-
pal to be paid. The event which triggers this call is provided by the
clause. Due-on-sale clauses are triggered by the mortgagor/owner
selling or otherwise transferring equitable title, and sometimes le-
gal title, to another. Due-on-encumbrance clauses are triggered by
the mortgagor/owner negotiating away any portion of his interest.
Although these are the most common of the provisions, a contract
can call for acceleration of the principal amount for any specified
reason, such as the failure of the resident owner to maintain the
property, the failure to purchase the required insurance, or any
other action prejudicial to the interests of the mortgagee/lender.
While the due-on-encumbrance clause used to be common, the
enforcement of this type of clause is suspect when the encum-
brance is merely an obligation junior to the mortgage. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court first refused to enforce this type of contract
provision in LaSala v. American Savings & Loan Association.'
The use of these clauses has receded and they are seldom the topic
of litigation unless other equitable matters exist to justify their
use.
Due-on-sale clauses, however, are present in nearly every new
real property mortgage document.4 The predominant form is the
one used by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation/ Fed-
eral National Mortgage Association, and commonly referred to as
"paragraph 17":
17. Transfer of the Property; Assumption. If all or any part of
the Property or an interest therein is sold or transferred by Bor-
rower without Lender's prior written consent, excluding (a) the
creation of a lien or encumbrance subordinate to this Mortgage,
(b) the creation of a purchase money security interest for house-
hold appliances, (c) a transfer by devise, descent or by operation
of law upon the death of a joint tenant or (d) the grant of any
3. 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971). The court held that the risk to the mortgagee's interest in a
junior lien situation did not justify the automatic exercise of due-on-encumbrance clause
and foreclosure.
4. Memorandum from Wyatt T. Martin, Staff director to Committtee on Commerce,
Florida House of Representatives (Mar. 12, 1981). VA and FHA insured loans are still ex-
empted from due-on-sale provisions.
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leasehold interest of three years or less not containing an option
to purchase, Lender may, at Lender's option, declare all the sums
secured by this Mortgage to be immediately due and payable.
Lender shall have waived such option to accelerate if, prior to the
sale or transfer, Lender and the person to whom the Property is
to be sold or transferred reach agreement in writing that the
credit of such person is satisfactory to Lender and that the inter-
est payable on the sums secured by this Mortgage shall be at such
rate as Lender shall request. If Lender has waived the option to
accelerate provided in this paragraph 17, and if Borrower's suc-
cessor in interest has executed a written assumption agreement
accepted in writing by Lender, Lender shall release Borrower
from all obligations under this Mortgage and the Note.
If Lender exercises such option to accelerate, Lender shall mail
Borrower notice of acceleration in accordance with paragraph 14
hereof. Such notice shall provide a period of not less than 30 days
from the date the notice is mailed within which Borrower may
pay the sums declared due. If Borrower fails to pay such sums
prior to the expiration of such period, Lender may, without fur-
ther notice or demand on Borrower, invoke any remedies permit-
ted by paragraph 18 hereof.'
This provision provides for protection of the lender through his
ability to (1) evaluate the creditworthiness of the prospective pur-
chaser and (2) secure an agreement to increase the interest rate to
his current rate. It protects the prospective purchaser by providing
that the acceleration will not be exercised for the imposition of a
junior lien, nor for a short-term lease, nor to prevent the property
from passing to a surviving joint tenant. Other provisions further
protect the borrower by prohibiting the invocation of any pre-pay-
ment penalty if the acceleration clause is exercised.6
While this provision is included in all mortgages written by fed-
eral savings and loan associations, with a similar provision for fed-
eral credit unions, it is not included in those loans insured by the
Federal Housing Authority (FHA), nor in those guaranteed by the
Veteran's Administration (VA). FHA and VA mortgages together
accounted for approximately 20% of new single family mortgage
loan originations in 1980.7 Although there have been proposals to
5. Paragraph 17, in compliance with 12 C.F.R. §§ 545.8-3(f) and (g)(1981), incorporates
the provisos of those sections.
6. 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(g)(2)(1981).
7. Report.An Economic Analysis of Due-On-Sale Clauses, set forth in 1980 HOUSING
AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE REPORT United States Department of Housing
and Urban Development 19 (Apr. 21, 1981).
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include a similar acceleration clause in the mortgages of those
agencies, they are currently free of any contract provisions limiting
assumption.8
B. History and Current Uses
The due-on-sale clause has been with us for a long time, becom-
ing popular in some loan documents around the turn of the cen-
tury. It was first brought into court in 1907, in the case of Tidwell
v. Wittmeier,9 and was found to be enforceable. There was very
little litigation on any aspect until the early 1960's. This renewed
interest is explained in a recent Minnesota decision:
As interest rates began to rise in the mid-1960's, the due-on-
sale clause became a vehicle, particularly in residential financing,
to ensure the lender's position in the money market. The lender,
faced with increasing costs of securing funds for new loans and
the need to maintain reserves to back existing loans, began to use
the due-on-sale clause to guarantee that its money was lent at
existing rates. The due-on-sale clause provided the lender with
the leverage to negotiate a higher rate of interest or, in the alter-
native, the ability to declare the entire balance due and owing,
thereby obtaining the funds to lend at existing interest rates. 10
The original purpose of the due-on-sale clause, the critics of its
use contend, was to provide security for the lender's interest in the
property. It did this by permitting the lender to evaluate the pur-
chaser's credit rating and personal history to assure that the pay-
ments could be met and the property would not be allowed to de-
teriorate.1 Any other use for such a provision was not forseeable
during the long years of stable interest rates when the difference
between new financing and assumption of an existing mortgage
was small and essentially a matter of administration fees. With the
instability occasioned by inflation, however, the interest rate
chargeable for a real estate loan became an important considera-
tion in the purchase price of real property.1 2 The mortgagor came
8. Id.
9. 43 So. 782 (Ala. 1907). An earlier similar case was Coffing v. Taylor, 16 Ill. 457 (1855),
but no clause was included in the mortgage. 69 A.L.R. 3d 756 (1976).
10. Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Fed. Say. & -Loan Ass'n, 308 N.W. 2d 471, 481
(Minn. 1981).
11. Matis, Due on Sale Clauses in MORTGAGES AND ALTERNATE MORTGAGE INSTRUMENTS,
405 (Practicing Law Institute, 1981).
12. Bonanno, Due on Sale and Prepayment Clauses in Real Estate Financing in Cali-
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to consider the low-interest loan to be a part of his property and
sought to defeat the due-on-sale contract provision which said that
it was not. Mortgagors sought relief in the courts to prevent en-
forcement of the due-on-sale provision. According to a recent sur-
vey, fourteen states have ruled in favor of enforcing due-on-sale
clauses, while eight states have refused to enforce them.13
C. The Dilemma of the Thrift Industry
The rising interest rates have also been a great detriment to the
lenders. Prior to 1978 the "thrift industry"-made up largely of
state or federally chartered savings and loan associations or credit
unions-was closely regulated concerning the amount of interest it
could pay on deposits. Mortgage loans were generally offered at 2
/4 % higher interest, which would cover the lender's operating
costs.14 When the rate of interest paid on deposits was regulated at
5 1 % mortgage loans ranged from 7 1/2 % to 8%.
By 1978, however, uncontrolled rates of interest on some other
investments (i.e., money market certificates) had created a process
known as "disintermediation," where people began to withdraw
their savings from the thrift institutions in search of greater earn-
ing in the uncontrolled investments.1 5 In order to stem this out-
flow, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board changed the regulations
governing the thrifts and allowed them to issue the high interest
money market certificates. The problem with this "solution" was
that most of the thrifts' assets were long-term fixed rate mort-
gages. They curtailed the outflow of funds only by fostering "inter-
nal disintermediation," the massive transfer of funds from pass-
book savings to certificate savings. They had decontrolled their
cost of money while their income remained tied to the low interest
mortgages. 6 In October 1978, the yield on the Federal National
Mortgage Association (FNMA) portfolio was 8.31 %, against an av-
erage cost of 7.80%-less than a traditional 2 %, but still re-
spectable. In January 1981 these figures were 9.25% (yield) but
funds were costing 10.01 %.' These costs have continued to rise, so
fornia in Times of Fluctuating Interest Rates-Legal Issues and Alternatives 6 U. S. F. L.
REV. 267, 309 (1972).
13. Martin, at 2.
14. Bomar, Due on Sale... A Partial Solution, FLORIDA SAVINGS AND LOAN LEAGUE RE-
CORD 4 (Dec. 1979).
15. White Strong Medicine for the S & Ls, FLORIDA TREND 41, 43 (Aug. 1981).
16. Id. at 41.
17. Economic Analysis, supra note 7 at 9.
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that FNMA's companion Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corpora-
tion's (FHLMC) weekly purchase of conventional mortgages for
the week of September 4, 1981, was at a rate of 18.138%."
A large portion of the mortgage money available to the buyer of
a home or business property comes through the mechanism of the
secondary mortgage market. This market exists because the small
banks and thrift associations can obtain money to loan for more
mortgages only if they sell their existing mortgages to others and
gain additional cash to loan. While some private agencies partici-
pate in the market, the bulk of the long-term mortgage purchasing
is done by three governmental agencies: the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC-usually called "Freddie Mac");
the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA-usually
called "Fanny Mae"); and the Government National Mortgage As-
sociation (GNMA-usually called "Ginnie Mae"). These agencies
purchase approximately 10% of the mortgages held by the thrift
institutions, 9 making large amounts of money available for addi-
tional loans.20
These secondary market agencies operate like huge national sav-
ings and loan associations. When the cost of obtaining funds ex-
ceeds revenue, they can no longer replace funds through purchases.
In order to help protect themselves from this squeeze, they devel-
oped a standard due-on-sale clause ("paragraph 17") and will only
purchase mortgage instruments containing this provision. In states
that do not enforce due-on-sale provisions in mortgage contracts,
these agencies will not purchase long-term contracts, but will only
buy instruments callable after seven years.21 The states which nor-
mally rely heavily on the secondary mortgage market are those
which experience high mobility in population, with the resultant
high turnover of housing and mortgages.22 Two states which have
this rapid turnover are California and Florida, neither of which
permits enforcement of due-on-sale clauses to adjust interest rates.
The effect is not only the loss of the secondary market in these
states, but a restriction on the FNMA and FHLMC attempts to
18. Wall Street Journal, Sept. 4, 1981, at 24 col. 3.
19. Memorandum, supra note 4 at 11.
20. Wiggin, Doing Business in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 5 REAL ESTATE REV. 84
(Summer 1975), reprinted in A. AXELROD, C. BERGER AND Q. JOHNSTONE, LAND TRANSFER
AND FINANCE 18 (1976 Supp.).
21. Wall St. J., Oct. 24, 1980, at 17, col. 3.
22. Comment, The Due-On Clause: A Preemption Controversy, 10 LOYOLA L. REV.
(L.A.) 629, 638.
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form a market of national scope.2
E. The Issues in the Debate
1. Unreasonable Restraint on Alienation?
The primary issue in the debate over the enforceability of due-
on-sale clauses is whether they constitute an unreasonable re-
straint on alienation. Both sides of the debate usually start with
the section 404 of the American Law Institute's Restatement of
the Law of Property,4 but they often reach opposite conclusions
from their reading. Both sides usually concede that the require-
ments of the due-on-sale clause do not clearly fit into any of the
categories specifically set out, and both usually agree that if the
due-on-sale clause occasions only an indirect restraint on aliena-
tion, it is enforceable. The disagreement surfaces when many
writers find that functionally, the clause acts as a direct promis-
sory restraint. In Nichols v. Ann Arbor Federal Savings & Loan
Association,2 the court found that the clause directly "burdens a
mortgagor's ability to alienate as surely and directly as the classi-
cal promissory restraint," and "[a]s such, the due-on-sale clause is
truly a direct restraint insofar as the category of direct restraints
can be articulated." 2' Professor Ronald Volkmer, in his 1973 study,
draws a parallel with the "fixed price preemption" and "quarter-
sale" provisions, which the Restatement does find to be direct re-
straints, to state that the due-on-sale clause has effects which can-
not be distinguished.2 7
Simes and Smith, in their 1956 treatise, make an initial determi-
nation that, "[a]ny provision in a deed, will, contract, or other legal
instrument which, if valid, would tend to impair the marketability
of property, is a restraint on alienation." They fail to specify
23. Report, supra note 7 at 6.
24. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, § 404 (1944). This section, which is too long to reproduce
here, describes the types of restraints on alienation.
25. 250 N.W. 2d 804 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977).
26. Id. at 805.
27. R. Volkmer, The Application of the Restraint on Alienation Doctrine to Real Prop-
erty Security Interests, 58 IowA L. Rzv. 747, 800 (1973). He describes the price preemption
provision as one which states that the "grantee is contractually bound not to sell his prop-
erty without first offering to sell to some designated person at a fixed price." Id. the "quar-
ter sale" provision is one where the "grantee is obligated to remit a certain percentage of the
sale price to some designated person." Id. These concepts seem distinguishable from the
practical effects of the due-on-sale clause.
28. L. SIMEs, & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FuTuRE INTERESTS, § 1111 (2d ed. 1956).
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what might "impair the marketability of property," however, and
later state, "[zioning ordinances might restrain marketability in
some cases, though it would seem that, if properly applied, they
should increase rather than decrease practical alienability.' 2 Gen-
erally, Simes and Smith seem to acknowledge that the question is
open for debate.
In recent years the debate has been taken up again, this time
with more speculation that due-on-sale may not be a restraint of
alienation of land, although it might restrain something else. Dunn
and Nowinski point out that the restraint effects only the transfer-
ability of the debt contract, rather than real property.30 They cite
Occidental Savings & Loan Association v. Venco Partnership,1
where the court studies the Restatement and comes to the conclu-
sion that the due-on clause "in no manner precludes the owner
from conveying property."3 ' In his earlier study, Dunn pointed out:
That general economic conditions may restrain the market is
quite possible, but these conditions are not restraints upon alien-
ation. If transactional costs and interest rates create a condition
of economic unfeasibility, certain buyers are naturally excluded
from the market. By forbidding enforcement of the due-on clause
as to existing. loans, such a buyer has automatic financing when
none is otherwise available. Whereas enforcement of the due-on
acceleration places all buyers and all sellers on equal footing in
such an economic climate, resulting in no increased restraint on
alienation, the automatic right of assumption provides an en-
hanced ability to alienate. 3
Many of the decisions which approve the enforcement of a due-
on-sale clause do so without reaching the issue of a possible re-
straint on alienation,3 or decide that the clause is not a restraint.35
29. Id.
30. Dunn & Nowinski, Enforcement of Due-On-Transfer Clauses, An Update, 16 RWL
PROP., PROB. & TRuST J. 291, 311 (1981).
31. 293 N.W. 2d 843 (Neb. 1980).
32. Id. at 312.
33. Enforcement of Due-on-Transfer Clauses. 13 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST J. 891, 916
(1978). This study finds other applicable analogies in the Restatement. Analogies are made
to § 410, which deals with restraints on assignments of possessory estates for years, and §
416, on consent-to-assignments requirements in land contracts. In the former they find no
basis for a restraints on alienation determination. In the latter they find a justifiable promis-
sory restraint. Id. at 900-01.
34. Examples are Tierce v. APS Co., 382 So. 2d 485 (Ala. 1979) (rehearing overruled
1980); Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v Wisconsin Wire Works, 239 N.W.2d 20 (Wise.
1976); Stith v. Hudson City Say. Inst., 313 N.Y.S. 804 (1970).
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An interesting approach was taken in Holiday Acres No.3,s6 where
the court stated that it was not a restraint on alienation in a case
of investment property, but implied that it would be in a residen-
tial mortgage.
A variation on this position is the determination that the due-
on-sale clause is a reasonable restraint on alientation which is en-
forceable because only unreasonable restraints are void. In Coast
Bank v. Minderhout s7 the court held that the exercise of the due-
on-sale clause is a reasonable restraint designed to protect the
lender's interest. Although some courts will find the adjustment of
interest a reasonable business interest per se,38 many others re-
quire an evaluation of the specific facts of each case.3 9 It is neces-
sary, therefore, to carefully read the actual provisions of the
contract.
Prior to the standard use of paragraph 17, many of the due-on-
sale clauses provided for acceleration of the notes at the lender's
option, but made no mention of the lender's right to accelerate
solely for the purpose of obtaining a higher rate of interest. Some
courts have interpreted such a general statement to be a "hidden"
provision, and have refused to allow acceleration when the sole rea-
son was to increase interest." The specific provision for agreement
35. A wide range of cases beginning with Cherry v. Home Savings & Loan 81 Cal. Rptr.
135 (1969) overruled 116 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1978) and continuing through Williams v. First
Federal Savings & Loan Association (1981), 1981 Trade Cas P64,095 (4th Cir. 1981) rule
that a due-on-sale clause does not constitute a restraint on alienation. Other examples are
Occidental Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco, 293 N.W.2d 843 (Neb. 1980); Crockett v. First Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 224 S.E.2d 580 (N.C. 1976); Gunther v. White, 489 S.W. 2d 529 (Tenn.
1973); Sonny Arnold Inc. v. Sentry Say. Ass'n, 615 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); and
the FHLBB Advisory Opinion No. 75-647, Schott v. Mission Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (1975).
36. 308 N.W.2d at 484. This idea is also shown in VA. CODE § 6.1-2.5, which bars due-on-
encumbrance clauses in one-to-four family residential dwelling units, but permits them in
real estate of a more commercial nature. In Medovi v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 152 Cal.
Rptr. 572 (1979), the court distinguishes Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 148 Cal. Rptr.
379 (1978) by limiting that decision to single family residences, holding it, therefore, not
applicable to commercial properties.
37. 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964) (modified by Wellenkamp).
38. Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 P.2d 1240 (Colo. 1973).
39. See Von Ehrenkrook v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 585 P.2d 589 (Colo. 1978);
Miller v. Pacific First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 545 P.2d 546 (Wash. 1976); Baker v. Loves
Park Say. & Loan Ass'n, 333 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1975); Peoples Say. Ass'n v. Standard Industries,
Inc., 257 N.E.2d 406 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970); Century Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Van Glahn,
364 A.2d 558 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976); Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Ham, 486 P.2d 190,
193 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971).
40. Examples of this may be found in Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Harn, 486 P.2d 190
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1971); Lane v. Bisceglia, 488 P.2d 474 (Ariz. 1971); First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Lockwood, 385 So. 2d 156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Silver v. Rochester State Bank,
424 N.Y.S. 2d 925 (1980); Continental Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fetter, 564 P.2d 1013
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on a rate of interest was one of the prime improvements in the
standard federal mortgage format. Many courts will consider the
interest revision a proper reason for acceleration if it is specifically
provided in the document."1
2. Threat to Lender's Security Interest Required?
There is no authority for declaring that a due-on-sale clause is
per se unenforceable. The position least favorable to the exercise
of a due-on-sale acceleration says only that a due-on-sale clause is
an unreasonable restraint on alienation unless the lender can prove
that his security is endangered. The degree of risk is determined
on a case-by-case basis, but normally a lender who refuses assump-
tion by someone who is totally uncreditworthy need not worry that
his attempt to accelerate will be considered unreasonable. 2
The concept of threat to the security interest was first articu-
lated in LaSala v. American Savings & Loan,45 which curtailed
California's tradition of automatic enforcement of due-on-sale
clauses. Since LaSala decided that a junior lien did not endanger
the lender's security, courts have added to the list of things that do
not threaten the security interest. These decisions place a signifi-
cant burden of proof upon the lender to establish that his security
interest is endangered.44 The provision in paragraph 17 which pro-
hibits application in the case of junior encumbrances has been the
source of litigation. Some mortgagors have attempted to sell the
mortgaged property on a "land sales contract" or "wraparound
(Okla. 1977), First Southern Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Britton, 345 So. 2d 300 (Ala. Ct.
App. 1977); Bellingham First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Garrison, 553 P.2d 1090 (Wash.
1976).
41. Bellingham Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Garrison, 553 P.2d 1090. The court seems to
place weight on the mortgagee acting in good faith to protect its investment.
42. Provided, apparently, that this justification is made at the beginning of proceedings.
In Tucker v. Pulaski Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n, 481 S.W. 2d 725 (Ark. 1972), the lender did
show that the assuming purchaser had a poor payment record on a previous mortgage and a
poor credit report. The court seemed to feel, however, that these factors had not been con-
sidered prior to the rejection, and since the assuming purchaser was making regular deposits
into the escrow account, the court refused to enforce the acceleration. 13 REAL PROP., PROB.
& TRUST J. at 911.
43. 97 Cal. Rptr. 849.
44. See Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978); Tucker v. Lassen
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974), Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 481
S.W. 2d 725 (Ark. 1972); Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 250 N.W. 2d 804
(Mich. Ct. App. 1977); Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Ham, 486 P.2d 190 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971);
Home Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. English, 249 So. 2d 707 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Clark v.
Lachenmeier, 237 So. 2d 583 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); and Pellerito v. Weber, 177 N.W.2d
236 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970).
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mortgage" concept. In these types of arrangements, legal title does
not transfer until the transferee has paid off the contract, which
usually includes the mortgagor's mortgage payment plus a pay-
ment for his/her equity. Since legal title remains with the mortga-
gor, many sellers have tried to classify this as a "junior lien" within
the meaning of paragraph 17."
The lender, of course, points to the fact that the purchaser is in
possession and that equitable title has been transferred. Despite
the fact that great ingenuity has been used in developing the tech-
nical details, the courts have generally held that a transfer, within
the meaning of paragraph 17, has taken place."
3. Unconscionable Contract Provision?
Some criticisms of the due-on-sale clause indicate that it may be
considered an unconscionable contract provision. Early actions
generally supported the contract as written, and did not consider
the due-on-sale clause unconscionable. Some lenders, however,
tried to exercise the due-on-sale clause against mortgagors who
sold their homes in the early years of the mortgage, then de-
manded that the mortgagor also pay a pre-payment penalty. An
example of this is Hellbaum v. Lytton Savings & Loan Associa-
tion. 7 When the Hellbaums lost the sale because of the buyer's
unwillingness to meet the lender's terms, the Hellbaums sued the
lender for their equity. The court held that they did not have a
cause of action, but seemed troubled by the inequity of applying
both the due-on-sale and the prepayment clauses.48
A case note on the Hellbaum decision 49 highlights the inequity
and suggests that a court might take the position that the lender
should be required to show why he should not be enjoined from
foreclosing. To prove his case, he would have to show a clear dan-
ger to his security interest. In Baltimore Life Insurance Co. v.
Harn,50 where the lender tried to invoke both due-on-sale and pre-
payment penalty clauses, the court chose not to take a position on
45. See Century Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Van Glahn, 364 A.2d 558 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1976). Cf. Chopan v. Klinkman, 330 So. 2d 154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
46. One exception to this is Chopan v. Klinkman, 330 So. 2d 154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1976) (Installment land contract not a "sale"). For further background see, Enforcement of
Due-On-Transfer Clauses, an Update 16 REAL PROP., PROB & TRUST J. 291, 300 (1981).
47. 79 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1969).
48. Id. at 11.
49. Note, The Case for Relief from Due-on-Sale Provisions: A Note to Hellbaum v. Lyt-
ton Savings and Loan Association, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 431 (1971).
50. 486 P. 2d 190 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971).
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the prepayment penalty, but refused to enforce the due-on-sale
clause absent proof of default in payments or threat to the lender's
security. Since this decision, the combination of prepayment
clauses and due-on-sale clauses have become virtually unknown,
and the standard FHLMC/FNMA mortgage specifically waives any
prepayment provisions if the due-on-sale provision is exercised. "
Another theory advanced for the concept that due-on-sale
clauses are unconscionable is that they can be seen as contracts of
adhesion. Many cases lead to the conclusion that due-on-sale
clauses are not per se unconscionable, but they may be applied
unreasonably. 52 In Tierce v. APS," the court found the use of due-
on-sale to meet rising interest rates a valid business purpose, but
warned that a court of equity may refuse to foreclose if accelera-
tion would have an inequitable or unjust result.54 Perhaps the fear
that acceleration was not within the contemplation of the parties,
or at least of the borrower, would justify such refusal.55 In Holiday
Acres No. 3, the court made a strong argument for the proposition
that due-on-sale clauses are contracts of adhesion:
In such a situation it is completely unrealistic to say that the
homeowner and the moneylender were on equal footing in making
the original contract and equally unrealistic to say that the home-
owner can avoid the loss resulting from the threat to accelerate
the due date of his note by paying off the mortgage or by re-
fraining from selling his home. He has to sell and he cannot pay
off the mortgage. This use of the acceleration clause to coerce an
increase in the rate of interest is oppressive, extortionate and
unconscionable.56
In a similar manner, due-on-sale clauses may often be felt to be
51. 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3 (g)(2).
52. See e.g. Cherry v. Home Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1969); Coast Bank v.
Minderhout, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964); Stith v. Hudson City Say. Inst., 313 N.Y.S. 2d 804
(1970); Tierce v. APS Co., 382 So. 2d 485 (Ala. 1979). See, also Mortgages-A Catalogue
and Critique on the Role of Equity in the Enforcement of Modern-Day "Due-on-Sale"
Clauses, 26 ARK. L. REv. 485, 500 (1972).
53. 382 So. 2d 485 (Ala. 1980).
54. Id. at 487.
55. See, J. Henkel and G. Seltzer, Acceleration Clauses in Mortgages: Misuse During
Periods of Tight Money, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 441, 454 (1980).
56. 308 N.W.2d at 482. The due-on-sale clause is seen to meet the criteria for a contract
of adhesion in a comment, The Due-on Clause: A Preemption Controversy, 10 LOYOLA L.
REV. L.A.) 629, 646 (1977). This position may have become less appropriate recently, due to
the wide publicity that mortgage assumption has received, and the relatively high level of
understanding of financing now common in the real estate industry.
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unconscionable because of an unfair association with the concept
of usury. In most cases the due-on-sale clause only requires re-ne-
gotiation of the interest rate to more nearly approximate the mar-
ket rate, and no attempt is made by the lender to charge any rate
in excess of the market rate. It is not usury to attempt to secure a
lawful rate of interest, nor is it an unconscionable or inequitable
act.5 7 There are valid arguments for enforcement of the clauses as
a matter of sanctity of contract.58
4. Equity in Due-On-Sale
Traditionally, any transaction in land has been considered gov-
erned primarily by the principle of equity. In one summary it was
said:
Mortgage foreclosure is an equity matter, and a court of equity
may refuse to foreclose a mortgage when an acceleration of the
due date would lead to inequitable or unjust results, or where the
acceleration is the result of some unconscionable or inequitable
conduct of the lender.59
The most frequently cited recent Florida decision on this issue is
Clark v. Lachenmeier.0 Here the Second District Court of Appeals
affirmed the dismissal of a complaint on the basis that it would be
inequitable to foreclose solely because of a provision in the mort-
gage which required notice to and approval by the mortgagee,
when no danger to the lender's security interest is shown. This
case is the definitive law on the subject in Florida and was followed
and expanded by First Federal Savings and Loan Association v.
Lockwood.6 1 This recent decision reaffirmed the role of equity and
determined that equity jurisdiction precludes preemption by fed-
57. See, Advisory Opinion of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Resolution No. 75-
647, Schott v. Mission Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, Civ-75-366 WMB (C.D. Cal. 1975) at 26.
58. R. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J. LAw & ECON. 293, 315
(1975).In Cherry v. Home Savings and Loan, 81 Cal. Rptr 135, the court refused to "rewrite
the contract," and upheld the due-on-sale clause. The court in Stith v. Hudson City Savings
Institution, 313 N.Y.S. 2d 804 found the language of the due-on-sale clause "clear and un-
ambiguous," and worthy of being enforced. The Tidwell v. Wittmeier, 43 So. 782 (Ala.
1907), due-on-sale clause was enforced primarily because it was part of the contract. Tidwell
is declared to be still good law in Tierce v. A.P.S. Co., 382 So. 2d 485, 487 (Ala. 1980).
Accord First Commercial Title, Inc. v. Holmes, 550 P.2d 1271, 1272 (Nev. 1976).
59. Annot., 69 A.L.R. 3d 713 (1976).
60. 237 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
61. 385 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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eral law when the mortgagee is a federal savings and loan."
The Lockwood court has been criticized for confusing true equity
considerations with substantive law." While there is little doubt
that equity applies to foreclosure actions, and that the traditional
equitable defenses-waiver, estoppel, accord and satisfaction, and
possibly laches"-apply, it should also be noted that equity is a
two-edged sword. As Nina Matis points out, "[B]etween mortgagor
or mortgagee there is nothing inequitable or unconscionable about
mortgagor enforcing its bargained for rights." When the Lock-
wood court ruled out preemption by federal law because foreclo-
sure actions are solely within the province of equity, it failed to
note that the federal courts also have equity powers. The United
States Supreme Court, in Stern v. South Chester Tube Co.," de-
clared that if no other remedy was available, the federal courts
have jurisdiction to grant relief under their traditional equity
power.
Judge Higby, in discussing Lockwood in First Federal Savings &
Loan Association v. Peterson, stated:
Both the court's opinion and the defendant's argument belabor
a man of straw. In our federal system, courts of all 51 sovereigns
apply the governing law regardless of the judicial forum utilized.
Much federal litigation is governed by state law. State courts
often apply the law of another state. An entire arcane body of
learning called Conflict of Law has evolved to help state courts
determine which state's law applies. State courts likewise apply
and enforce federal law. If they refuse to honor the supremacy of
federal laws, federal courts can enforce them.17
Equity seen from the federal point of view may be very different
from that of the more parochially-oriented state court. In a juris-
diction where due-on-sale clauses are not enforced, the seller is
"able to appropriate most of this gain [of selling the low interest
62. Id. at 160.
63. Dunn and Nowinski, note 30 supra at 297.
64. In Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wisconsin Wire Works, 205 N.W.2d 762 (Wis.
1973), the court held that laches would apply where appropriate, but that the mortgagee
was not placed on constructive notice of a transfer by the recording of a land contract. The
Recording Act was merely to give notice to subsequent purchasers, and recording could not
affect the rights of the prior mortgagee.
65. N. Matis, Due on Sale Clauses, MORTGAGES AND ALTERNATE MORTGAGE INSTRUMENTS
(Practising Law Institute, 1981).
66. 390 U.S. 606, 609 (1968).
67. 516 F. Supp. 732, 740-41 (1981).
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loan with the house] by selling their houses at a higher price than
sellers of houses without assumable mortgages." 5 While this wind-
fall may be very good for sellers, it comes at a cost to prospective
new borrowers who must pay higher interest to offset the outstand-
ing low interest loans. If the lender must continue to carry the low-
interest loan, he will charge even higher interest on new loans to
compensate for the loss on the old loan. This particularly handi-
caps the young family in search of a home, since they typically
have limited funds for a down-payment. Assumable loans tend to
require a higher down-payment to cover the owner's equity, so
young families must compete in a market where loans have even
higher interest rates to compensate lenders for their cost in main-
taining the assumed, low-interest loans. Requiring assumability of
loans also has a significant adverse effect on the earnings of savings
institutions and ultimately on their net worth. 9
As already noted, savings and loan associations and other thrift
organizations have been at a severe disadvantage in a period of ris-
ing interest rates. Their only protection, before the recent authori-
zation to use variable rate mortgages, was insertion of a due-on-
sale clause in the mortgage contract. The FNMA/FHLMC Para-
graph 17 is not a fine print, boiler plate provision. It quite clearly
states the terms of the contract. Refusal to enforce it may be far
more inequitable than enforcement.
The federal thrift organizations are bound by federal policies
telling them to exercise due-on-sale clauses, and state policies
which say the clauses cannot be enforced. This problem has caused
many thrifts to look to the possibility of federal preemption of the
issue.7 0
68. HUD report, supra note 7 at 5.
69. 57% of a major Florida thrift's portfolio is composed of loans that yield an 8.9%
return or less, as shown in Otis White, Strong Medicine for the S&L's, FLORIDA TREND 41,
42 (August 1981). Nationally, analysts predict industry losses that may total six to eight
billion dollars. Id.
70. It is interesting that two states often considered leaders in real estate litigation, Cali-
fornia and Florida, have decisions which disfavor the use of due-on-sale clauses to adjust to
market-rate interest See Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978); Clark
v. Lachenmeier, 237 So. 2d at 583. These two states are also considered traditional leaders
in the savings and loan field, with California having the largest S & L industry and Florida
ranking second. See White, supra note 69, at 42.
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III. FEDERAL PREEMPTION
A. The Basis for Preemption
The concept of federal preemption of state law lies in the United
States Constitution. The supremacy clause7 requires that federal
law overrule any state law on the same subject. The preemption
doctrine strikes down all state laws in the area validly pre-
empted. 72 Preemption applies not only where federal and state law
are in obvious and direct conflict, but also where Congress has in-
dicated an intent that federal law occupy a field to the exclusion of
state law.73 The tests of congressional intent to displace state law
are set out in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.:
[Congressional] purpose may be evidenced in several ways. The
scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make rea-
sonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it. Or the Act of Congress may touch a field in which
the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same sub-
ject. Likewise, the object sought to be obtained by the federal law
and the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the
same purpose.74
The first test in determining if intent to preempt is implied is
whether the federal regulation is so pervasive as to leave no room
for state regulation. Since the FHLBB Regulations deal specifically
with the power of the federal thrift association to include the due-
on-sale clause in the mortgage and indicate that the exercise by an
association of such an acceleration clause shall be governed by the
terms of the contract,75 there is little doubt that the regulation
71. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Au-
thority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
72. See, Pre-emption of Local Rent Control Laws by HUD Regulation, 45 FORDHAM L.
REV. 651, 652 (1976).
73. Dunn and Nowinski, 16 RE.AL PROP., PROB & TRUST J. at 292.
74. 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (citations omitted).
75. 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(1981):
(f Due-on-sale clauses. An association continues to have the power to include,
as a matter of contract between it and the borrower, a provision in its loan instru-
ment whereby the association may, at its option, declare immediately due and
payable sums secured by the association's security instrument if all or any part of
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leaves no room for state regulation. The challenge to this argument
is the contention that Congress did not, in the Home Owners' Loan
Act of 1933 (HOLA) 76 provide the FHLBB the power to preempt
due-on-sale laws of the states, but merely to regulate the internal
affairs of the federal savings and loan associations. To show that
state control is a congressional mandate, challengers cite provisions
of HOLA section 1464 which specifically subject some federal sav-
ings and loans to more stringent state laws pertaining to neighbor-
hood discrimination 77 and state taxation which does not exceed
that levied on like organizationss.7  As support for its contention
that broader state control is implied, the Minnesota Supreme
Court has stated that "[d]espite the specificity with which the
above issues were addressed, no mention of due-on-sale clauses is
made."'79 This seems an interesting twist on the canon of statutory
construction of expressio unios est exclusio alterius, that the ex-
pression of one thing excludes another.80
An article that relies heavily on a perceived internal-external di-
chotomy purports to find basis for a distinction between internal
and external authority in several of the cases which ultimately rule
for preemption on the due-on-sale issue. 81 This author is unable to
find, in the sources cited, any clear rejection of the idea that fed-
eral authority is comprehensive on the issue of preemption.82
The "pervasiveness" of the legislative scheme that calls for pre-
emption is usually found in the extremely broad mandate that
Congress gave the FHLBB to fashion the regulations under which
congressional policy would be carried out. Section 1464 of the
Home Owners Loan Act conferred on the FHLBB authority to reg-
ulate the operations of federally-chartered savings and loan as-
the real property securing the loan is sold or transferred by the borrower without
the association's prior written consent. Except as provided in paragraph (g) of this
section with respect to loans made after July 31, 1976, on the security of a home
occupied or to be occupied by the borrower, exercise by the association of such
option (hereafter called a due-on-sale clause) shall be exclusively governed by the
terms of the loan contract, and all rights and remedies of the association and the
borrower shall be fixed and governed by that contract.
76. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-68 (1976).
77. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a)(Supp. III, 1979).
78. Id. at § 1464(h) (1976).
79. 308 N.W. 2d at 476.
80. See, Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Ca-
nons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VANDERBILT L. Rav. 395, 405 (1949).
81. Comment, Due-on-Sale Clauses and Restraints on Alienation: Does Wellenkamp
Apply to Federal Institutions? 11 PAC. L. J. 1085, 1100 (1980).
82. Prime sources used on the subject are Meyers v. Beverly Hills Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 499 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1974) and the Advisory Opinion, supra note 57 at 18.
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sociations.8 3 Even the term "giving primary consideration to the
best practices of local mutual thrift and home financing institu-
tions in the United States," which is sometimes construed to imply
local control,84 seems instead to give the Board the choice of the
best practices to form a national standard. Starting from the his-
toric assumption that state police powers will not be superceded by
federal law unless it is the "clear and manifest purpose" of Con-
gress to do so,8" the Ninth Circuit found in Conference of Federal
Savings & Loan Associations v. Stein8 that "the regulatory con-
trol of the Bank Board over federal savings and loan associations is
so pervasive as to leave no room for state regulatory control.",8
The court is supported in this position by the statement in Meyers
v. Beverly Hills Federal Savings & Loan Association,88 that "pur-
suant to its valid statutory authority, the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board has promulgated comprehensive regulations covering
all aspects of every federal savings and loan association 'from its
cradle to its corporate grave.' ,9 While unwilling to rule for pre-
emption on such a wide scale, Judge Higby in Peterson found that
preemption was required on the subject of due-on-sale enforce-
ment.90 This decision has been followed in the recent decision of
Price v. Florida Federal Savings & Loan Association,9 1
The second test established in Rice is whether the subject is a
field in which the federal interest is so dominant as to demand
exclusive federal control. Generally, it is the national nature of the
secondary mortgage market which makes this test seem applica-
83. HOLA, Section 5(a)(1) provides:
In order to provide local mutual thrift institutions in which people may invest
their funds and in order to provide for the financing of homes, the Board is au-
thorized, under such rules and regulations as it may prescribe, to provide for the
organization, incorporation, examination, operation, and regulation of associations
to be known as "Federal Savings and Loan Associations" . . . and to issue char-
ters therefor, giving primary consideration to the best practices of local mutual
thrift and home-financing institutions in the United States. 12 U.S.C. §
1464(a)(1).
84. Id. Cf. 10 LOYOLA L. REv. (L.A.) supra note 56, at 634. Note that this quote stops
before completion of the sentence.
85. 331 U.S. at 230.
86. 604 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'd 445 U.S. 921 (1980).
87. Id. at 1260.
88. 499 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1974).
89. Id. at 1146-47. Quoting People v. Coast Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 316
(S.D. Cal. 1951).
90. 516 F. Supp. at 741.
91. - F. Supp. - Case No. 79-974-Civ.-J.-M. (M.D. Fla., 1981).
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ble." There are clear signs of a current intent to declare a federal
interest in enforcing due-on-sale clauses in many federal lending
areas." Judge Higby, in Peterson, finds that the importance of a
national secondary mortgage system has asserted a unique federal
interest in due-on-sale clauses which is dominant.' This same no-
tion was challenged in Holiday Acres No. 3 by the contention that
the federal due-on-sale provision is merely permissive and does
not, therefore, achieve a dominant interest." In view of the indi-
vidual thrift's fiduciary duty to follow the FHLBB's interpretation
of "best practices," one might question how voluntary the use of
due-on-sale is, but this challenge will doubtless be asserted again.
The third test established in Rice deals with the underlying pur-
pose of the regulation and whether preemption is necessary to ac-
complish that purpose. This is a test for actual conflict, regardless
whether the semantics indicate a conflict. In cases where state au-
thority would defeat the goals of federal regulation, the Supreme
Court has been most specific. For example, in Bethlehem Steel Co.
v. New York State Labor Relations Board, the Court stated:
"[T]he power of the state .may not so deal with matters left to its
control as to stand 'as an obstacle to the accomplishment and exe-
cution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."'" More-
over the Court states in Hines v. Davidowitz that the common ex-
pressions "conflicting; contrary to; ... interference" are only
yardsticks to determine if the state law "stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objec-
tives of Congress. 97 Concerning due-on-sale specifically, Judge
Higby states, "Allowing Florida to refuse to enforce due-on-sale
clauses when acceleration is to raise interest rates would thus frus-
trate the HOLA's purpose as implemented by the Board. Preemp-
tion is required to further that purpose because the association
system calls for federal control of the securities marketed."98 The
Minnesota Supreme Court, in reaching an opposite result on this
92. See, Due-On Clauses, 10 LOYOLA L. Rav. (L.A.) at 638. See notes 19 through 23 and
accompanying text.
93. See, e.g. 46 Fed. Reg. 38676 (July 29, 1981) proposing enforcement of due-on-sale
clauses in all documents of the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), and 46 Fed.
Reg. 18932 (March 27, 1981) showing intent to retain enforceable due-on-sale clauses in the
new Adjustable Rate Mortgages.
94. 516 F. Supp. at 740.
95. 308 N.W. 2d at 479.
96. 330 U.S. 767, 773 (1947), quoting Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
97. 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
98. 516 F. Supp. at 740.
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issue, stated, "(W]e can only say, with the Supreme Court of Ore-
gon, 'we do not believe that .preemption occurs simply because
under some imaginable set of economic facts the application of
state law could impede the efficient execution of a federal statutory
purpose.' ,9 They do not find the secondary mortgage market
problems a reason for preemption.
B. Preemption in Other Areas
An analogy to the question of due-on-sale preemption can be
made to in the area of federal preemption in rent control contro-
versies. Like mortgages, rent has traditionally been an area within
the police powers of the states. Here, as in due-on-sale provisions,
Congress does not expressly preempt state and local regulation.
The National Housing Act (NHA) must be considered in conjunc-
tion with regulations of the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment (HUD) to determine if state or local rent control laws
are nullified with respect to specific projects.100 The question turns,
in rent control, on the first and third tests established in
Rice-pervasive federal interest and frustrating the intent of the
program. Conflict arises when HUD establishes what it considers a
minimum rent which will support the project, thereby preserving
federal subsidies or federal (NHA or FHA) loan guarantees, and a
local or state rent control board demands a lower rental than this
minimum. This conflict creates a threat to the project's continued
functioning which has usually, but not always, led to a determina-
tion that the HUD regulations preempt the local rent scheme.
In Levin-Sagner-Orange v. Rent Leveling Board,101 the court
held that the HUD regulation, preempting the entire field of rent
regulation, was a valid exercise of the Secretary's rule-making au-
thority. In 515 Associates v. City of Newark10 2 the court held that
the National Housing Act authorizes the Secretary to formulate
such regulations as necessary to implement the provisions of the
Act, thereby defeating Tenth Amendment challenges. A wave of
earlier cases reached contrary results based on the contention that
the regulation only authorized the Department to regulate maxi-
mum rents. Consequently the regulation was re-worded to provide
99. 308 N.W. 2d at 479, quoting Derenco, Inc. v. Benjamin Franklin Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 577 P.2d 477, 483, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1051 (1978).
100. Comment, Pre-emption of Local Rent Control Laws by HUD Regulation, 45 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 651, 662 (1976).
101. 316 A.2d 616 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976), aff'd 371 A.2d 302 (1976).
102. 424 F. Supp. 984 (D. N.J. 1977).
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coverage of the minimum rent also.10 3
C. Other Signs of Current Congressional Intent
Congress and the FHLBB have recently taken several steps
which demonstrate their intention that the federal savings and
loan associations survive and retain their fair share of the housing
market financing. The first step was the 1978 authorization to issue
six-month money market certificates with interest rates which
could fluctuate with the rates on U.S. Treasury bills. As mentioned
earlier, this was intended to stem the flood of depositors who were
withdrawing their funds from the savings and loans in search of
higher interest.
The money market certificates accomplished part of their
goal-that of keeping deposits in the savings and loans. However,
the money market certificates were so successful that they resulted
in even greater withdrawals from the 5 % accounts. 1 " The cost
of savings and loan deposits jumped upward, while their assets
were still tied up in long-term mortgages. The money market cer-
tificates were not themselves a mistake. The mistake was that it
took too long to provide any flexibility on the other side of the
equation. 5
In July of 1979, the thrifts were finally authorized to issue a Va-
riable Rate Mortgage (VRM).10 6 Otis White, staff writer for Florida
Trend magazine, explains the concept:
Broadly stated, here's how the adjustable rate mortgage works:
The homebuyer and his savings and loan agree upon a mortgage
rate and a monthly payment for his home loan. The buyer pays
the same monthly payment for an agreed-upon period, generally
between two and five years. But evep as the homebuyer makes his
payments, his actual interest rate changes, fluctuating according
to the movement of interest rates on one of several cost-of-funds
indexes from which the S&Ls can choose.
At the end of the period, the homebuyer and the S&L must
settle up. If the interest rate has declined since the mortgage was
negotiated, the S&L will extend the mortgage at a lower interest
rate to compensate for the changes. If the interest rate has in-
creased, the homeowner will see his mortgage payments escalate
103. Comment, supra note 100 at 43.
104. White, supra note 15 at 43.
105. Id. See also, An Economic Analysis, supra note 7 at 8.
106. Henkel and Seltzer, supra note 55 at 456.
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to pay for the increases.'0 7
While it was once hoped that the VRM would render moot the
due-on-sale controversy, it is now obvious that it will not do so for
several reasons: (1) federal regulation originally limited the invest-
ment in all alternative mortgage instruments to no more than 50%
of an institution's portfolio, 0 8 (2) the interest rate on such mort-
gages cannot be increased more than 2 1/2 % over the term of the
loan,10 9 and (3) it will take years for long-term lenders to shift their
portfolios into the new instruments.
The FHLBB proposed regulations on September 30, 1980, to
permit the use of Shared-Appreciation Mortgages (SAM). In this
type of mortgage the borrower agrees to share the property's ap-
preciation with the lender in return for a mortgage rate below that
on standard mortgages." 0 "The borrower agrees to pay the lender
a lump sum of 'contingent interest' that is dependent upon the ap-
preciation of the property securing the loan and a prespecified
share of that appreciation.""' This transaction is fairly easy if the
house is sold during the period prior to the "date of reckoning."
The payment can then be made from the equity the borrower re-
ceives. It becomes more complicated if the borrower remains in
possession because he must now come up with the funds for the
contingent interest and appreciation based on a current appraisal
of the property."12
Another device to prevent disintermediation and to lower the
cost of money for the thrifts is the tax-sheltered "All-Savers' Cer-
tificate." With this the thrift should be able to limit its cost of
money to the 12% range and yet attract funds seeking a real re-
turn near 17%.113 These instruments only became effective on Oc-
tober 1, 1981, so it is too early to see how they will be accepted. It
is interesting to note, however, that they were authorized only af-
107. White supra note 15 at 43.
108. Martin, supra note 4 at 11. The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980 has removed the ceiling, but instituted limitations on how much the
rate can be adjusted at any interval of time. Dunn and Nowinski, supra note 30 at 313.
109. Id.
110. J. McKenzie, A Comprehensive Look at Shared-Appreciation Mortgages, 13
FHLBB J. 11 (1980).
111. Id. at 13.
112. Id. at 13.
113. The ability of the thrift to pay the lower rate (70% of the current rate for a 52 week
Treasury Bill) and have greater effective yield is the tax exempt feature. A typical table of
equivalent earnings is:
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ter the Congress had severely limited the tax-exempt status of mu-
nicilal mortgage subsidy bonds.1 1 4 The municipal mortgage sub-
sidy bond had become a popular, tax-exempt method of gaining
funds for housing construction or purchase. As such it undoubtedly
contributed to disintermediation of the thrift industry. Although
many feel that the real problems in housing finance could be han-
dled more efficiently by these municipal bonds than by the All-
Savers' Certificates, "1 5 the fact that this technique was given to the
thrift industry does show a definite congressional intent to assure
the survival of the savings and loan associations.
The problem with these efforts is that, for the most part, they
may be too little, too late." 6 The need for enforcement of due-on-
sale clauses remains as strong as ever.
D. Federal Court Decisions
California and Florida, with their high volumes of real estate
turnover, their large real estate industries, and their correspond-
ingly large thrift industries, are logical places for the controversy
over preemption to be most severe. In California the state position
is presented in Wellenkamp, which prohibits exercise of due-on-
sale unless the lender's security is threatened. The federal decision
in Glendale Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Fox" 7 clearly
rules for preemption of federal law in due-on-sale clauses by fed-
eral thrift associations. This case has now been appealed to the
Ninth Circuit. In Florida the state law is established by Clark v.
Lachenmeier,"8 and the state position on preemption by Lock-
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Probable Tax Single Joint Single Joint Single Joint Single IJoint
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11.50% 15.75% 14.20% 17.69% 16.20% 19.17% 17.16% 23.00% 20.54%
12.00% 16.44% 14.81% 18.46% 16.90% 20.00% 17.91% 24.00% 21.43%
12.50% 17.12% 15.43% 19.23% 17.61% 20.83% 18.66% 25.00% 22.32%
*Based on 1982 Tax Tables. Assumes 15% itemized deductions, plus standard exemptions.
Pamphlet, Flagship Bank Tallahassee, Fla. (1981) (on file with FSU Law Review).
114. J. Broadus, The Mortgage Subsidy Bond Tax Act of 1980: A Step in the Wrong
Direction, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 469 (1981).
115. Id. at 470-71.
116. White, supra note 17 at 44. See also, Miami Herald, August 23, 1981 (J. Russell,
Financial Editor).
117. 459 F. Supp. 903 (1978) (Partial summary judgment) and 481 F. Supp. 616 (1979)
(summary judgment made final).
118. 237 So. 2d 583.
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wood." 9 The federal courts in Florida were initially hesitant to ac-
cept federal question jurisdiction, remanding several cases to state
court, but finally accepting two for consideration.20
The first complete consideraton of preemption in the federal
courts of Florida came in First Federal Savings and Loan Associa-
tion v. Peterson, decided June 22, 1981.2 Judge Higby found ba-
sis for preemption under all of the tests enunciated in Rice, and
stated that, On the issue of exercising due-on-sale clauses to obtain
a higher interest rate, federal law preempts all state law. This deci-
sion was followed by the decision in the Middle District in Sep-
tember, 1981, in Price v. Florida Federal Savings and Loan Asso-
ciation.1 22 In this decision Judge Melton takes note of several
federal court decisions that have opted for federal preemption of
due-on-sale provisions and cites with approval the reasoning of
Peterson.1 23
E. Legislative Consideration
In an interesting parallel development, the Florida Legislature
considered the issue of due-on-sale provisions in its 1981 session.
Under strong lobbying from the savings and loan associations and
with strong opposition from realtors' organizations, the Florida
House of Representatives considered and passed House Bill 1052.
This bill was essentially a legislative policy statement supporting
the enforceability of acceleration clauses to raise interest rates or,
in the alternative, to call such loans due pursuant to the terms of
the mortgage.12 4 The bill provided certain conditions such as a pro-
viso that the right to provide increased interest is specifically in-
cluded in the mortgage, and that no prepayment penalty could ac-
company the payment of the note following failure to agree on a
119. 385 So. 2d 156.
120. In May of 1980, the Middle District took up two cases, Kirkland v. Fidelity Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, - F. Supp. -, Case No. 79-859 (M.D. Fla. May 16, 1980); and Price v.
Florida Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, _-F. Supp._, Case No. 79-974-Civ-J-M (M.D. Fla. May
23, 1980). The results were mixed-Kirkland was remanded to state court, while Price was
retained on federal question jurisdiction. In January of 1981, the case of Schultz v. Coral
Gables Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 505 F. Supp. 1003 (S.D. Fla. 1981) was removed to the
Southern District federal court and was subsequently remanded to the state court on proce-
dural grounds. Following the reasoning of Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936),
the court refused to rule that the invocation of the doctrine of federal preemption was ade-
quate to establish federal question jurisdiction. Id. at 1011.
121. 516 F. Supp. 732.
122. Case No. 79-974-Civ.-J.-M. (M.D. Fla. 1981).
123. Id. slip op. at 5.
124. H.B. 1052, FLORIDA LEGISLATIVE REPORTERS (1981).
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higher rate of interest. 2 5 In the Florida Senate the question was
not reported out of committee prior to adjournment. It is not
known whether this question will be considered in the 1982 Legis-
lative session, but the possibility of federal preemption should en-
courage legislators to take steps to assure that state chartered
thrift associations do not end up bound by restrictions that federal
chartered associations can evade.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is clear from congressional acquiesence in FHLBB actions,
and in their own actions in allied fields, that Congress intends to
insure the survival and viability of the federal thrift association.
Congress would probably require federal preemption in any case of
conflict with that objective. It is probable, but less clear, that Con-
gress would also intend preemption because of pervasive federal
occupation of the field.
If a state wishes to retain some control over the area of mortgage
operaton and foreclosure, then, it would seem necessary to avoid
direct conflict with the objectives of a program Congress considers
vital. This may well be what Minnesota has been able to do
through their decision in Holiday Acres No. 3. The Minnesota Su-
preme Court will undoubtedly face the problem again when a resi-
dential mortgage, rather than an investment property, is at issue.
In the meantime they have some "breathing room" and an oppor-
tunity to avoid conflict in future cases. Certainly they will be less
likely to cause a preemption mandate than a state that makes a
claim that only state courts can enforce equity matters.
California cannot easily avoid this conflict. The obviouA conflict
of Wellenkamp and Glendale is too direct and the state statutes
too clearly in conflict with the FHLBB position. Florida, however,
is not so circumscribed. The issue has never been ruled on by the
Florida Supreme Court. Given the right case, the court could
choose a position which would avoid direct conflict and yet main-
tain state authority over this traditionally state-controlled area.
The Florida Legislature also has the opportunity to relieve the
source of this conflict and at the same time, assure that state-
chartered thrift associations are not caught at a disadvantage.
All of the cases currently mandating preemption (Glendale, Pe-
terson and Pierce) are on appeal to the federal appeals court for
125. Id. at 1.33-1.46.
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their respective circuits. Even after a decision at this level for pre-
emption, it would require a decision by the United States Supreme
Court before the preemption decision would be mandatory on the
states. Given the restraint of the current Court, it is doubtful that
it would decide for preemption based on pervasive occupation of
the field alone, so long as there were no clear conflicts with the
intent of an important congressional program.
Due-on-sale clauses are not necessarily inequitable and appear
to be an economic necessity. The question is no longer whether
they will ultimately be approved, but by whom.
